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1 Introduction
What distinguishes competitive markets from alternative systems? This was the central
question during the 1930s debate among Lange, Lerner, von Mises and Hayek on whether
competitive equilibria can be replicated by socialist central planning. The question is echoed
recently by Rubinstein [16, pp. 880–881], who argues that all the welfare and existence
properties of competitive equilibria are also satisfied by the equilibria in a hypothetical
jungle of brute forces disregarding property rights.1 To answer this question, Hayek [11, 12]
anticipated the modern economics of information by suggesting that the essence of markets
is to handle decentralized information. In this paper, we pursue a different, core equivalence
approach, which relates competitive equilibria to a decentralized model of property rights.
Our result is core equivalence theorems based on new concepts of the core in production
economies carved up by property rights.
The idea of core equivalence is to think of a competitive equilibrium as merely the
description of the path of a more completely specified equilibrium whose off-path scenario is
that any other allocation whose deviation from the competitive conditions is sufficiently large
would be blocked by some coalition of individuals with their own resources. In other words,
although Hayek and Rubinstein are right to point out the fact that the path of such a more
completely specified equilibrium does not distinguish itself from socialist central planning
or jungles of brute forces, the off-path scenario of the equilibrium provides a distinction for
competitive markets because coalitional blocking is based on property rights for individuals.
However, the traditional literature of core equivalence (Edgeworth [8], Debreu and
Scarf [7] Anderson [4], etc.) does not have a model where coalitions take as given the
property rights on the firms.2 The main unsolved problem is that a firm may be owned only
partially by members of a coalition that attempts to block an allocation, with the remaining
ownership lying outside the coalition. Then how should one define what blocking plans can
1 With the land privatization in China happening at the same time as the massive financial bailout in
the United States and Western Europe, the question about the distinction between capitalism and socialism
is not irrelevant to current events. For example, Ralph Nader was reported to claim that the “[US] bailout
was socialism rescuing capitalism” (Pankratz [15]).
2 Debreu and Scarf [7] in their case with production assume that technologies exhibit constant returns to
scale and are available to all coalitions. Hildenbrand [13, Chapter 4] and Boehm [6] assume that every possible
coalition is endowed with a technology. Allingham [2, pp. 52–53] and Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [1]
assume that technologies are divisble and a shareholder controls a fraction of the firm’s production set.
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be made by a coalition?3
Haller [10] proposes a notion of blocking with property rights on the firms. A coalition
may direct a firm to supply any technologically feasible production bundle as long as the
coalition owns a majority share of the firm. The production bundle supplied by any firm
is distributed to its shareholders in proportion to their shares. The problem is that such
blocking plans may be infeasible for those outside the coalition, say leaving a negative quan-
tity of some good for the outsiders to consume. Such a problem arises because the outsiders
still need to fulfill their obligations to the firms where they hold shares, while they cannot
balance their resources through trading goods with the coalition.
In a recent paper [17], we fix this feasibility problem by proposing a notion considerate
blocking . The idea is to add a requirement that the total bundle a blocking coalition leaves
for its outsiders should be nonnegative for every good, so that the outsiders can consume
what is left for them feasibly. Based on considerate blocking, that paper presents a core
equivalence theorem for privatized production economies.
However, considerate blocking still has a problem. Even if feasible, a considerate
blocking plan may be too draconian for the outsiders to bear. In that case, the outsiders
might want to default on their obligations to the firms and walk away with their endowments.
If they manage to secede as such, the plan of the blocking coalition may be upset, as part
of its plan may depend on the production of the firms that it shares with the outsiders. In
Section 3, we illustrate this problem with an example.
This paper presents a solution. Here we formulate the outside option for any group
of individuals as secession, forfeiting all their shares in the firms and pooling together only
the goods that they are endowed with. A group of individuals can block an allocation
with secession if secession makes each of them better-off than the allocation. Then we add
a participation constraint to the notion of considerate blocking: the blocking plan should
contain an allocation for the outsiders which the outsiders as a whole cannot block with
secession. We also add the participation constraint to any core allocation: no group of
individuals can block a core allocation with secession. The solution concept thereof is fair
3 The recent club-formation literature such as Allouch and Wooders [3] and Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer
and Zame [9] consider the formation of firms as part of the equilibrium or core allocation. These authors
take the approach of Hildenbrand and Boehm that endows every possible coalition with a set of technologies,
so that any coalition is assumed to use some production technologies from which outsiders are excluded.
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core. And we prove a core equivalence theorem of fair cores (Theorem 1). This result does
not require any more assumption than our recent paper [17].
In a fair core, the participation constraint on a blocking plan is collective in the sense
that the outsiders need to act as a single group to block it with secession. We strengthen
this participation constraint by requiring that a blocking plan should not be blocked with
secession by any group of outsiders. The solution concept thereof is sup-fair core. Adding
an assumption about the preferences, we prove a core equivalence theorem of sup-fair cores
(Theorem 2).4
Perhaps the nearest to our theory is the concept of bargaining set introduced by Au-
mann and Maschler [5]. They require that an objection to an allocation should itself survive
counterobjections, and we require that a blocking plan of an allocation should itself survive
blocking with secession. Behind this parallel, however, is a main difference. A counterob-
jection to an objection is to get some of the coalition members betray the coalition. As a
coalition of traitors from a previous coalition may be vulnerable to betrayal itself, the notion
of counterobjection naturally leads to more complicated notions such as counterobjections
to counterobjections, ad infinitum. By contrast, secession-blocking is not to estrange the
original blocking coalition. Rather, a secession group merely walks away with their own
endowed goods, hence there is no need to involve anyone outside the secession group. It
affects the original blocking plan just because the secession disrupts the production of the
firms in which the secession group holds shares. The fact that core equivalence is proved for
fair and sup-fair cores suggests that our concepts may have an advantage of tractability.
2 The Primitives
There are a finite set I of individuals, a finite set J of firms, and a finite number l kinds of
goods. Let i be the index for individuals and j for firms. Let θij be i’s share of firm j, with∑
i∈I θij = 1 for all j. Let Rl+ be the consumption set of each individual, i individual i’s
preference relation on Rl+ (with strict preference i), ei (∈ Rl+) his endowment, and Yj
(⊆ Rl) the production set of firm j. An allocation is denoted by (x, y) := ((xi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J),
4 While sup-fair blocking is mathematically stronger than fair blocking, fair core based on fair blocking is
still interesting in its own right, because secession is often such a divisive issue that individuals in a society
may be torn between the two camps by the “you are either with us or against us” binary mindset.
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meaning that individual i consumes the bundle xi and firm j’s production plan is yj. An
allocation (x, y) is feasible if xi ∈ Rl+ and yj ∈ Yj for each individual i and each firm j and∑
i∈I xi =
∑
i∈I ei +
∑
j∈J yj. A coalition S is a nonempty set of individuals.
A replica economy of size r, denoted by Er, consists of r units , each of which has
exactly the same composition of individuals, firms, endowments, and corporate ownership.
We name an individual by an integer-pair i := (i1, i2), and a firm by j := (j1, j2), meaning—
i1 := the type of the individual (exactly one such individual in each unit);
i2 := the unit to which the individual belongs;
j1 := the type of the firm (exactly one such firm in each unit);
j2 := the unit to which the firm belongs.
Individuals or firms of the same type have the same characteristics:
(i1,i2) = (i1,i′2) =: i1 ;
e(i1,i2) = e(i1,i′2) =: ei1 ;
Y(j1,j2) = Y(j1,j′2) =: Yj1 ;
θ(i1,k),(j1,k) = θ(i1,k′),(j1,k′) =: θi1j1 .
Individuals in one unit have zero share of firms in other units:
θ(i1,i2),(j1,j2) =
 θi1j1 if i2 = j20 if i2 6= j2.
Let
I1 := the index set for individual-types;
J1 := the index set for firm-types.
An allocation ((xi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) has the equal treatment property (ETP) if individuals
and firms of the same type have the same consumption and production plan, i.e.,
x(i1,i2) = x(i1,i′2) =: xi1 ;
y(j1,j2) = y(j1,j′2) =: yj1 .
The following Assumptions 1–4 are usual, with the last one ensuring the ETP for firms.
Assumption 1 For any individual i, i is strongly monotone, strictly convex (convex and
strongly convex), and lower semicontinuous on Rl+.
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Assumption 2 The total endowment
∑
i∈I ei  0, i.e., it has positive quantity of each
good. Every individual’s endowment is a point in Rl+ \ {0} (i.e., ei 	 0 for all i ∈ I).
Assumption 3 For every firm j, 0 ∈ Yj and Yj is convex.
Assumption 4 For each firm j, no point on the production possibility frontier is the mid-
point of any two distinct points of the production set Yj.
3 A Motivating Example
Let us start with a production economy with two consumers, two goods, and one firm:5
Firm :
{
(y1, y2) ∈ R2 : y1 ≤ 0; y2 ≤
√
|y1|
}
;
Ms. 1 : e1 = (0, 1), u1(x11, x12) = x11x12, θ1 = 1/2;
Mr. 2 : e2 = (1, 0), u2(x21, x22) = x21x22, θ2 = 1/2.
Consider the status quo allocation:
y = (−1/9, 1/3), x1 = (2/3, 1), x2 = (2/9, 1/3). (1)
This allocation is aggregate feasible, as x1 + x2 = (2/3, 1) + (2/9, 1/3) = (8/9, 4/3) and
e1+ e2+ y = (0, 1)+ (1, 0)+ (−1/9, 1/3) = (8/9, 4/3). The allocation is also Pareto optimal,
with marginal rate of substitution and technical rate of substitution equal to each other:
x12
x11
=
1
2/3
=
3
2
,
x22
x21
=
1/3
2/9
=
3
2
,
1
2
√|y1| = 12√1/9 = 32 .
Hence (1) is a price equilibrium with transfers, supported by a price vector (3, 2). At (1),
Ms. 1’s utility is 2/3, and Mr. 2’s utility is 2/27.
In (1), Mr. 2 is arguably exploited by Ms. 1, who gains an amount of good 1 without
giving up any bit of good 2. Evaluated by the price vector (3, 2), the value for Mr.2 to trade
with Ms. 1 is negative:
(3, 2) · (2/9, 1/3)− (3, 2) · (1, 0)− 1
2
((3, 2) · (−1/9, 1/3) = 4
3
− 3− 1
6
< 0.
5 The Cobb-Douglas utility function in this example can be easily modified to satisfy all the assumptions
postulated above, including strong monotonicity and strict convexity on the boundary of R2+. For example,
let u(z1, z2) := z1z2 if z1 > 0 and z2 > 0, u(z1, z2) := −e−z1−z2 if z1 = 0 or z2 = 0.
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The question is Can Mr. 2 somehow block the allocation (1)?
Coming from the notion of blocking in exchange economies, an idea is that Mr. 2 may
want to cut off his trade with Ms. 1 and forfeit his share in the firm so that he can consume
his own endowment (1, 0). Generating only 1× 0 = 0 utility, however, this blocking scheme
does not make Mr. 2 better-off.
What about refraining from trading with Ms. 1 and yet still honoring the share in the
firm? To pursue this idea, first we need to specify what it means by honoring one’s share in
the firm. In the Arrow-Debrue model, one’s share in a firm merely means his share of the
profit of the firm with a price taken as given. As blocking occurs off the path of price-taking
behavior, we need to enrich the meaning of corporate shares that defines the property rights
in the off-path events of blocking. Here we assume that, in case of blocking, the production
bundle of a firm is distributed to its shareholders in the proportion of their shares of the
firm. In this example, if the firm carries out the production plan (−1/9, 1/3), half of this
bundle is distributed to Mr. 2. Then Mr. 2 can consume
e2 +
1
2
y = (1, 0) +
1
2
(−1/9, 1/3) = (17/18, 1/6),
which yields a utility 17/108, greater than the utility 2/27 that Mr. 2 gets in (1).
Thus, Mr. 2 would be better-off if he could follow the above blocking plan. But the
blocking plan is infeasible because it would leave Ms. 1 the infeasible bundle
e1 +
1
2
y = (0, 1) +
1
2
(−1/9, 1/3) 6∈ R2+.
This problem was identified by our recent paper [17]. The solution provided by that
paper is that the bundles left for those outside a blocking coalition may become feasible if the
economy is replicated. In this example, let us make one copy of the two-consumer economy
and combine the two economies into one. Now let us revisit the original Mr. 2’s blocking
plan of not trading with the others while honoring his shares in the firm. As before, this
plan, if implemented, would make him better-off. The question is Can it be implemented?
In this replica economy, excluded by the blocking plan of the original Mr. 2, the out-
siders are the original Ms. 1, the copy of Ms. 1 called Ms. 1∗, and the copy of Mr. 2 called
Mr. 2∗. Given Mr. 2’s blocking plan, the bundle of the outsiders’ total resources is
e1 + e1 + e2 +
1
2
y + y = (0, 1) + (0, 1) + (1, 0) +
1
2
(−1/9, 1/3) + (−1/9, 1/3) = (5/6, 5/2),
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which is nonnegative in each good and hence can be split into feasible consumption bundles
and distributed among Ms. 1, Ms. 1∗, and Mr. 2∗.
While the feasibility problem is resolved, the incentive issue needs to be dealt with.
Would the original Mr. 2’s blocking plan make the other individuals so worse-off that they
may try to upset the blocking plan?
For instance, suppose the bundle (5/6, 5/2), which is what is left for the outsiders given
Mr. 2’s blocking plan, is divided into three consumption bundles, (1/12, 2), (3/8, 1/4) and
(3/8, 1/4), one for each of the three outsiders. Then their utilities are respectively 1/6, 3/32
and 3/32. But then the three outsiders could do better if they could pool together only
their endowments and forfeit their shares of the firms. If they manage to do so, their total
resource is the bundle e1+e1+e3 = (1, 2), which they can divide into three identical bundles
(1/3, 2/3) so that each could have a utility equal to 2/9, larger than 1/6 and 3/32.
Such manner for the outsiders to upset the blocking plan of Mr. 2 we shall generalize
into the notion of secession-blocking, as if the outsiders secede from the existing corpo-
rate ownership system and walk away with only their endowments. If the outsiders do
that, Mr. 2’s blocking plan cannot be implemented, because it needs the production bundle
(−1/9, 1/3), which in turn requires the endowments from the outsiders.
To solve this problem, we modify Mr. 2’s blocking plan. For instance, suppose the
bundle (5/6, 5/2), which is what is left for the outsiders given Mr. 2’s blocking plan, is
evenly distributed among the outsiders Ms. 1, Ms. 1∗, and Mr. 2∗, so that each of them
consumes 1
3
(5/6, 5/2) = (5/18, 5/6) and gets a utility 25/108. Then the outsiders as a whole
cannot benefit from secession-blocking Mr. 2’s blocking plan. To see that, note that the total
endowment among the three is (0, 1)+(0, 1)+(1, 0) = (1, 2). Since the three agents have the
same, convex preference relation, one of them must get a utility (weakly) less than 2
9
, which
is the utility generated by 1
3
(1, 2) = (1
3
, 2
3
) and is less than 25/108.6 Therefore, the outsiders
as a whole cannot upset the modified blocking plan by secession.
It follows that Mr. 2’s modified blocking plan supplemented with the expectation that,
in response to his blocking action, every outsider consumes the bundle (5/18, 5/6), is self-
consistent. It is self-consistent because the blocking plan can be carried out and make Mr. 2
better-off given such expectation of the outsiders’ response, and because the outsiders as a
6Suppose (1, 2) is distributed to the outsiders as z1, z2, z3 with z1 + z2 + z3 = (1, 2). Without loss of
generality, suppose z1  z2  z3, by convexity 13 (z1 + z2 + z3) = 13 (1, 2)  z1.
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whole cannot benefit from deviating from such expected response given the blocking action
of Mr. 2. Such notion of blocking we shall formulate as fair blocking in Section 4.
4 Fair Blocking with Collective Secession
For every initial assignment ((θij)i∈I)j∈J of shares and every coalition S, let J˜(S) be the
set of all the firms that switch to the proposal of coalition S if S is blocking the status
quo. (For example, every firm holds a referendum with all its shareholders and it switches
to the blocking coalition’s proposal if and only if the proposal gets a vote greater than a
predetermined threshold.) We assume that the function J˜ is exogenous.
For linguistic convenience, let us rephrase the definition of considerate blocking in [17]:
Definition 1 (considerate blocking) A coalition S considerately blocks a feasible alloca-
tion (x, y) := ((xi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) with an alternative feasible allocation ((x′i)i∈I , (y
′
j)j∈J) if
i. x′i ∈ Rl+ for all i ∈ I, and y′j ∈ Yj for all j ∈ J ,
ii. for each i ∈ S, x′i i xi,
iii. if j 6∈ J˜(S) then y′j = yj,
iv.
∑
i∈S x
′
i =
∑
i∈S ei +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J θijy
′
j,
v.
∑
i∈¬S x
′
i =
∑
i∈¬S ei +
∑
i∈¬S
∑
j∈J θijy
′
j.
Conditions (iv) and (v) calculate the resources available for a coalition based on the
coalition members’ property rights on the goods and the firms. In particular, in the event of
blocking, if a firm j is to receive a production plan yj, a shareholder i is assumed to receive a
bundle θijyj in the proportion of his ownership θij. Since blocking is an off-path scenario, an
observer outside the economy might not even be able to observe or falsify the assumption.
Provisions (i) and (v) constitute the outsiders’ feasibility condition we proposed in a
recent paper [17], which improves upon the traditional notion of blocking. However, the
condition does not rule out a blocking plan that, through the predetermined obligation to
joint ventures, takes away so many resources from the set ¬S of outsiders that ¬S would
rather secede from the joint ventures, taking with them only their endowed goods. Hence
we formalize the notion of secession as follows.
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Definition 2 (blocking with secession) An allocation (x′, y′) is blocked by coalition S
with secession if: for each i ∈ S there is x′′i ∈ Rl+ such that x′′i i x′i and
∑
i∈S x
′′
i =
∑
i∈S ei.
The assumption that a seceding coalition can take with them only their endowed goods
is to capture the detrimental effect of secession in the simplest possible manner. In extreme
cases, secession may ruin the social infrastructure so much that neither side of the conflict
can produce much. In our production economy, secession disrupts production because a
contractual relationship that the shareholders have agreed upon is being torn apart without
mutual agreement—the blocking coalition counts on the contractual relationship to obtain
its resources while its complement wants to secede from the contract.7 8
Definition 3 (fair blocking) A feasible allocation (x, y) is fairly blocked by coalition S if:
a. either S blocks (x, y) with secession,
b. or S considerately blocks (x, y) with an alternative feasible allocation ((x′i)i∈I , (y
′
j)j∈J)
that is not blocked by ¬S with secession.
Case (a) in the above definition is included so that the option of secession is even-
handedly available to both sides of a blocking plan. It plays a role in the proof of the equal
treatment property of core allocations.
To illustrate case (b), suppose S considerately blocks (x, y) with a blocking plan (x′, y′),
but ∑
¬S
∑
J˜(S)
θijy
′
j +
∑
¬S
∑
¬J˜(S)
θijyj  0.
Then it is not a fair blocking plan, because ¬S blocks (x′, y′) with secession: The above
inequality implies that there is a bundle v 	 0 such that∑
¬S
ei = v +
∑
¬S
ei +
∑
¬S
∑
J˜(S)
θijy
′
j +
∑
¬S
∑
¬J˜(S)
θijyj = v +
∑
¬S
x′i =
∑
¬S
(
x′i +
1
|¬S|v
)
;
7 To dissolve the joint ownership in a manner that may be mutually agreeable, one possible procedure
is that the seceding party gives up its shares to the other party. But such arrangements would make core
equivalence easy to fail, as pointed out in our recent paper [17, p. 256], because then a coalition may want
to pillage the corporate shares from the outsiders by forcing them to secede.
8 An alternative formulation for less detrimental secession is to allow a seceding group to keep the firms
where it has full ownership. Such a notion may be less tractable, as our preliminary investigations indicate
that the equal treatment property may fail for the core based on such notion of secession.
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by monotone preferences, x′i +
1
|¬S|v i x′i for all i ∈ ¬S.
The fair core of an economy is the set of all feasible allocations that are not fairly
blocked.
Lemma 1 If every individual i’s preference relation i is locally non-satiable, then any
Walras equilibrium allocation belongs to the fair core.
Proof If an equilibrium (x, y, p) is blocked under case (b) in the definition of fair blocking,
derive a contradiction by mimicking the standard proof. If it is blocked under case (a), i.e.,
(x, y) is secession-blocked by some S and a plan (x′′i )i∈S, then∑
i∈S
p · x′′i >
∑
i∈S
p · ei +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J
θijp · yj ≥
∑
i∈S
p · ei =
∑
i∈S
p · x′′i ,
contradiction. (The first inequality follows from consumer-optimization at (x, y, p), the sec-
ond one follows from profit maximization at (x, y, p) and 0 ∈ Yj for all j, and the equality
due to the resource-feasibility condition of secession-blocking.)
4.1 The Equal Treatment Property
Lemma 2 By Assumptions 1–4, any fair core allocation has the ETP.
Proof Let (x, y) be a fair core allocation of an r-replica economy. As in the proof of ETP
in Xiong and Zheng [17], (x, y) is Pareto optimal and hence it has the ETP for firms.
To prove that (x, y) has the ETP for consumers, suppose otherwise.
For each consumer-type i1 ∈ I1, let ι2(i1) be a unit where the type-i1 individual does
the worst among type-i1 individuals at (x, y). Let S := {(i1, ι2(i1) : i1 ∈ I1}.
If S blocks (x, y) with secession, then by case (a) of the definition of fair blocking, we
are done. For the rest of the proof, suppose that S cannot block (x, y) with secession.
Consider an alternative allocation (x′, y′): every firm j produces yj as in the status quo
(x, y), i.e., y′j = yj for every j; every individual i := (i1, i2) consumes
x′(i1,i2) :=
1
r
r∑
i2=1
x(i1,i2).
Obviously, (x′, y′) is a feasible allocation. As in the proof of the ETP lemma in Xiong and
Zheng [17], it is also feasible within S and satisfies the outsiders’ feasibility condition; it is
also an improvement within S.
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Thus, if ¬S cannot block (x′, y′) with secession, then S fairly blocks the status quo
(x, y) and we are done. Hence suppose that ¬S blocks (x′, y′) with secession, i.e., there is
(x′′i )i∈¬S such that x
′′
i i x′i for all i ∈ ¬S and
∑
¬S x
′′
i =
∑
¬S ei. Let
x′′′(i1,ι2(i1)) :=
1
r − 1
∑
i2 6=ι2(i1)
x′′(i1,i2).
By
∑
¬S x
′′
i =
∑
¬S ei, we have
∑
S x
′′′
i =
∑
S ei because
(r−1)
∑
i1∈I1
x′′′(i1,ι2(i1)) =
∑
i1∈I1
∑
i2 6=ι2(i1)
x′′(i1,i2) =
∑
¬S
x′′i =
∑
¬S
ei =
∑
i1∈I1
∑
i2 6=ι2(i1)
ei1 = (r−1)
∑
i1∈I1
e(i1,ι2(i1)).
Since x′′i i x′i for all i ∈ ¬S, x′′′i1 i1 x′i1 for all i1 ∈ I1 by convexity of preferences. Then for
each i ∈ S, x′′′i i x′i i xi. Hence S blocks (x, y) with secession, a contradiction.
With the ETP, fair core allocations in economies of different sizes can be identified with
the element of the same space,
(
Rl+
)I1 ×∏j1∈J1 Yj1 . Denote Crfair for the subset of this space
that represents the fair core of replica economy of size r. Since Walras equilibrium allocations
are in the fair core for any r, their ETP is preserved by replication. Hence denote W for the
subset of
(
Rl+
)I1 ×∏j1∈J1 Yj1 that represents the set of Walras equilibrium allocations.
4.2 The Core Equivalence Theorem
Why are non-equilibrium allocations eventually blocked when the economy is replicated? To
answer this question, we first separate allocations into two categories. An allocation (x, y) is
called pure exchange if yj = 0 for every firm j ∈ J ; denote such allocation by (x, y | y = 0).
If yj 6= 0 for some firm j ∈ J , we say it is productive and denote (x, y) by (x, y | y 6= 0).
For a pure exchange allocation, the argument is an extension of the standard proof of
core equivalence for exchange economies.
For a productive allocation, assume without loss of generality that it is Pareto optimal.
Given a blocking coalition, an individual from the outsiders is said involved if he belongs
to the same unit of some member of the coalition and else is called uninvolved . As the
allocation is Pareto optimal, it is costly for the uninvolved outsider to give up the production
and participate in secession-blocking. Hence they need to be compensated by the involved
outsiders. The more uninvolved outsiders, the bigger this compensation is needed. Thus,
when the number of units is sufficiently large, the involved outsiders cannot gain enough to
compensate for the sacrifice of the uninvolved outsiders from blocking with secession.
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In our recent paper, Xiong and Zheng [17], we have shown that the next assumption
is indispensable for core equivalence based on considerate blocking.
Assumption 5 (boundary aversion) Every individual strictly prefers any interior point
of Rl+ to any boundary point of Rl+.
We can show that the fair cores shrink as we enlarge the economy, i.e., C1fair ⊇ C2fair ⊇
C3fair.... First, suppose an allocation (x, y) is blocked with secession in the economy Er by a
coalition S with the plan (x′i)i∈E. Then, (x, y) is blocked with secession in the economy Er+1
by the same coalition S with the same plan (x′i)i∈E. Second, suppose an allocation (x, y) is
considerately blocked in the economy Er by a coalition S with the plan (x′, y′) such that no
subset of Er\S can block (x′, y′). Consider Er+1 := Er ∪ E ′ and the coalition S ′ := S ∪ E ′,
i.e., the union of S and the (r + 1)th copy E ′ of the prototype economy. We claim that S ′
fairly blocks (x, y) with the plan
(
(x′i, y
′
j)i∈I(Er),j∈J(Er), (xi, yj)i∈I(E ′),j∈J(E ′)
)
,
i.e., the original economy Er adopts the plan (x′, y′) and the additional economy E ′ stays
with the plan (x, y). Clearly, no subset of Er+1\S ′ = Er\S can block this plan with secession.
Also, in the coalition S ′ = S ∪ E ′, the members of E ′ get at least as well off as (x, y) and the
members of S get strictly better-off than (x, y). Then by lower semicontinuity of preferences
we can transfer a sufficiently small bundle of goods from S to the rest of the coalition, so that
everyone in the coalition gets strictly better off. Therefore, C1fair ⊇ C2fair ⊇ C3fair.... Theorem 1
shows that the sequence converges to the set of Walrus equilibria.
Theorem 1 By Assumptions 1–5, W = ∩∞r=1Crfair.
Proof First, by Lemmas 1 and 2, W ⊆ ∩∞r=1Crfair.
We still need to prove ∩∞r=1Crfair ⊆W.
First, we claim that any non-equilibrium allocation can be fairly blocked if it is a pure
exchange allocation, i.e., if it is of the form (x, y | y = 0).
We may assume without loss that (x, y | y = 0) is Pareto optimal (otherwise it is
blocked by the grand coalition). Thus, (x, y | y = 0) is a price equilibrium with nonzero
transfer under some price p ∈ Rl. Note that dividends at this equilibrium are zero. Since
transfer is nonzero, p · xi 6= p · ei for some consumer i.
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Consider the pure exchange economy that is the same as the original production econ-
omy except that all production sets are {0}. In this economy, x is again a price equilibrium
with nonzero transfer under the price p, because p · xi 6= p · ei for some consumer i. By core
convergence in pure exchange economies, x is blocked by some blocking plan (x′i)i∈S. Then
in the original economy, S considerately blocks (x, y | y = 0) with the plan ((x′i)i∈S,0).
Given this blocking plan, which conducts zero production, condition (iv) of consider-
ate blocking says that the aggregate consumption for the set ¬S of outsiders is equal to∑
i∈¬S ei, which can be turned into any Pareto optimal allocation (x
′
i)i∈¬S within ¬S subject
to
∑
¬S x
′
i =
∑
¬S ei. Then the alternative allocation ((x
′
i)i∈S, (x
′
i)i∈¬S,0) cannot be blocked
by ¬S with secession. Hence S fairly blocks (x, y | y = 0) in the original production economy.
Second, we claim that any non-equilibrium allocation can be fairly blocked if it is a
productive allocation, i.e., if it is of the form (x, y | y 6= 0).
By the ETP of fair core allocations, we may assume without loss that (x, y | y 6= 0)
satisfies ETP. As y 6= 0, yj∗1 6= 0 for some firm-type j∗1 ∈ J1.
We may also assume without loss that (x, y | y 6= 0) is Pareto optimal (otherwise it is
blocked by the grand coalition). Then it is a price equilibrium with nonzero transfer under
some price p.
By the considerate core convergence theorem of Xiong and Zheng [17], (x, y | y 6= 0)
is considerately blocked by some coalition S within some r-replica economy Er, with an
alternative allocation (
(x′i)i∈S, (x
′
i)i∈I(r)\S, (y
′
j)j∈J(r)
)
.
Here I(r) and J (r) denote the sets of individuals and firms in Er.
Now add N copies of the unit economy. Let I(N) and J (N) denote the sets of individuals
and firms in these N units, and let Er+N denote the enlarged, (r+N)-replica economy. Note,
in Er+N , the coalition S in the original Er considerately blocks (x, y | y 6= 0) with the plan(
(x′i)i∈S , (x
′
i)i∈I(r)\S , (xi)i∈I(N) ,
(
y′j
)
j∈J(r) , (yj)j∈J(N)
)
, (2)
i.e., the agents in the original Er follow ((x′i)i∈S, (x′i)i∈I(r)\S, (y′j)j∈J(r)) and the agents in the
new N replica follow (x, y | y 6= 0). Here the set of outsiders becomes the disjoint union
between I(r)\S and the agents in the N additional replica, I(N), with a consumption plan
((x′i)i∈I(r)\S , (xi)i∈I(N)).
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To complete the proof, we claim: the outsiders (I(r) \ S) ∪ I(N) cannot block the
alternative allocation (2) with secession when N is sufficiently large.
Suppose the outsiders can block (2) with secession, with a plan
(
(x˜i)i∈I(r)\S , (xˆi)i∈I(N)
)
.
We may assume without loss that the (xˆi)i∈I(N)) here satisfies ETP (otherwise, replace every
xˆi by
∑N
i′2=1
xˆ(i1,i′2)/N for every i ∈ I(N)). Thus, the secession-blocking plan is(x˜i)i∈I(r)\S , (xˆi1)i1∈I1 , . . . , (xˆi1)i1∈I1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
 . (3)
Let
V :=
{∑
i1∈I1
ti1 : ti1 ∈ Rl+ and ti1 i1 xi1 for all i1 ∈ I1
}
.
V is convex, because it is the sum of upper contour sets, which are convex. Thus, V ,
the closure of V , is both closed and convex.
Also,
∑
i1∈I1 ei1 /∈ V . Suppose
∑
i1∈I1 ei1 ∈ V , i.e., there is
(
tni1
)
i1∈I1 such that∑
i1∈I1 t
n
i1
→n
∑
i1∈I1 ei1 and t
n
i1
i1 xi1 for all i1 ∈ I1 and for all n. Recall (x, y | y 6= 0) is
a price equilibrium with transfer under price p. By local non-satiation, tni1 i1 xi1 implies
p · tni1 ≥ p · xi1 . Hence
p ·
∑
i1∈I1
ei1 = lim
n→∞
p ·
∑
i1∈I1
tni1 ≥ p ·
∑
i1∈I1
xi1 = p ·
(∑
i1∈I1
ei1 +
∑
j1∈J1
yj1
)
.
Thus, for the firm-type j∗1 such that yj∗1 6= 0, both 0 and yj∗1 are profit maximizers under p,
contradicting the uniqueness of profit maximum given Assumption 3.
Since V is closed and convex and
∑
i∈I1 ei /∈ V , by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem,
there exist q ∈ Rl \ {0} and c ∈ R such that q ·∑i1∈I1 ei1 < c and q · v > c for all v ∈ V .
Since q ·∑i1∈I1 ei1 < c, define
ξ := q ·
∑
i1∈I1
ei1 − c < 0.
Recall, from the fact that (3) is a secession-blocking plan of (2), that xˆi1 i1 xi1 for all
i1 ∈ I1. Hence
∑
i1∈I1 xˆi ∈ V . With q · v > c for all v ∈ V , we have
q ·
∑
i1∈I1
ei1 − q ·
∑
i1∈I1
xˆi1 < q ·
∑
i1∈I1
ei1 − c = ξ < 0. (4)
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By the resource constraint for the secession-blocking plan (3) for the outsiders,∑
i∈I(r)\S
x˜i +N
∑
i1∈I1
xˆi1 =
∑
i∈I(r)\S
ei +N
∑
i1∈I1
ei1
⇒
∑
i∈I(r)\S
x˜i −
∑
i∈I(r)\S
ei = N
(∑
i1∈I1
ei1 −
∑
i1∈I1
xˆi1
)
⇒ q ·
 ∑
i∈I(r)\S
x˜i −
∑
i∈I(r)\S
ei
 = N (q ·∑
i1∈I1
ei1 − q ·
∑
i1∈I1
xˆi1
)
. (5)
The left-hand side of Eq. (5) is bounded from below by −q ·
(∑
i∈I(r)\S ei
)
; the right-hand
side, however, is less than Nξ by Eq. (4), which goes to −∞ as N → ∞. Thus, Eq. (5)
cannot hold when N is sufficiently large. This contradiction implies that the outsiders cannot
block (2) with secession when N is sufficiently large.
Therefore, any non-equilibrium (x, y | y 6= 0) can be fairly blocked, as claimed.
5 Sup-Fair Blocking When Anyone May Secede
The notion of fair blocking requires only that the outsiders—as a whole—cannot block the
coalition’s alternative allocation with secession. Next we consider another notion of blocking
where any proper subset of the outsiders may also block with secession.
To illustrate, let us recall the example in Section 3. There the original Mr. 2’s blocking
plan leaves a bundle (5/6, 5/2) to be consumed by the outsiders, Ms. 1, Ms. 1∗, and Mr. 2∗.
Part of the blocking plan is to divide the bundle evenly among the three so that each gets a
utility 25/108. Then the outsiders as a whole cannot benefit from secession.
However, Ms. 1 and Mr. 2∗ could be better-off if they are allowed to form a secession
coalition with only the two of them. Their total endowment is e1 + e2 = (1, 1), which can
be split evenly between the two, giving each a utility 1/4, greater than 25/108. If Ms. 1
and Mr. 2∗ manage to secede in this manner, the production plan (−1/9, 1/3) cannot be
implemented, so the original Mr. 2’s blocking plan would fail.
To make the original Mr. 2’s blocking plan feasible despite such secession-blocking, the
bundle (5/6, 5/2) left for the other individuals needs to be allocated with some care. One
such allocation is to give Mr. 2∗
(
5
6
− , 5
2
− ) and to give ( 
2
, 
2
)
to each Ms. 1 and Ms. 1∗,
where  > 0 is chosen to be small so that
(
5
6
− ) (5
2
− ), the utility for Mr. 2∗, is greater
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than 2. (Such  exists because (5/6)(5/2) = 25/12.)
Then no one can benefit from secession-blocking Mr. 2’s blocking plan. Without in-
volving Mr. 2∗, Ms. 1 and Ms. 1∗ can only get zero utility. To involve Mr. 2∗, however, they
need to give him a utility greater than two, but the bundle of the total resources available
for the three of them, should they secede, is only e1 + e1 + e2 = (1, 2), which can generate a
utility of at most 2.
In the following, we study a stronger notion of blocking, sup-fair blocking, that allows
any set of outsiders to secede. Again, it can be shown that any Walras equilibrium cannot
be sup-fairly blocked. However, can any non-equilibrium be sup-fairly blocked if we include
sufficiently many copies of economy? The answer is again Yes (Theorem 2), if we make an
additional assumption on the differentiability of agents’ utility function.
Definition 4 (sup-fair blocking) A feasible allocation (x, y) is sup-fairly blocked by coali-
tion S if:
a. either S blocks (x, y) with secession,
b. or S considerately blocks (x, y) with an alternative feasible allocation ((x′i)i∈I , (y
′
j)j∈J)
that is not blocked by any subset of ¬S with secession.
5.1 The Equal Treatment Property
Lemma 3 By Assumptions 1–4, any sup-fair core allocation has the ETP.
Proof Let (x, y) be a fair core allocation of an r-replica economy. As in the proof of ETP
in Xiong and Zheng [17], (x, y) is Pareto optimal and hence it has the ETP for firms.
To prove that (x, y) has the ETP for consumers, suppose otherwise.
If (x, y) can be blocked by some coalition with secession, then we are done. For the
rest of the proof, suppose that (x, y) cannot be blocked by any coalition with secession.
For each consumer-type i1 ∈ I1, we can find a one-to-one function ιi1 : {1, 2, ..., r} →
{1, 2, ..., r} such that the r type-i1 individuals are listed as xi1,ιi1 (1)), . . . , x(i1,ιi1 (r)) such that,
x(i1,ιi1 (1)) i1 x(i1,ιi1 (2)) i1 ... i1 x(i1,ιi1 (r)).
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Define a new allocation, (x′, y) as follows. For each consumer-type i1 ∈ I1,
x′(i1,ιi1 (r)) :=
1
r
r∑
k=1
x(i1,ιi1 (k)),
x′(i1,ιi1 (h)) :=
r − 1
r
x(i1,ιi1 (h)) +
1
r
x(i1,ιi1 (r)) ∀h ∈ {1, 2, ..., r − 1}.
Consider the coalition S := {(i1, ιi1(h)) : i1 ∈ I1 and h ∈ {1, 2, ..., r − 1}}. We will
show S considerately blocks (x, y) such that no subset of ¬S can block (x′, y) with secession.
First, note that (x′, y) is a feasible allocation within ¬S:∑
i∈¬S
x′i =
∑
i1∈I1
x′(i1,ιi1 (r)) =
∑
i1∈I1
1
r
r∑
k=1
x(i1,ιi1 (k)) =
1
r
∑
i1∈I1
r∑
i2=1
x(i1,i2)
=
1
r
∑
i1∈I1
r∑
i2=1
(
ei1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi1j1yj1
)
=
∑
i∈¬S
(
ei1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi1j1yj1
)
,
where the fourth equality follows from the feasibility of the allocation (x, y).
Second, (x′, y) is a feasible allocation for the grand coalition I:∑
i1∈I1
(
x′(i1,ιi1 (r)) +
∑
k 6=r
x′(i1,ιi1 (k))
)
=
∑
i1∈I1
(
1
r
r∑
h=1
x(i1,ιi1 (h)) +
∑
k 6=r
(
r − 1
r
x(i1,ιi1 (k)) +
1
r
x(i1,ιi1 (r))
))
=
∑
i1∈I1
(
1
r
x(i1,ιi1 (r)) +
1
r
∑
k 6=r
x(i1,ιi1 (k)) +
r − 1
r
∑
k 6=r
x(i1,ιi1 (k)) +
1
r
∑
k 6=r
x(i1,ιi1 (r))
)
=
∑
i1∈I1
(∑
k 6=r
x(i1,ιi1 (k)) + x(i1,ιi1 (r))
)
=
∑
i1∈I1
r∑
k=1
x(i1,ιi1 (k)).
Third, (x′, y) is a feasible allocation within S. That follows from the fact that (x′, y)
is a feasible allocation within ¬S and within I.
For all h ∈ {1, 2, ..., r− 1}, since x(i1,ιi1 (h)) i1 x(i1,ιi1 (r)), strict convexity of preferences
implies x′(i1,ιi1 (h)) i1 x(i1,ιi1 (h)). Hence, every member of S gets strictly better-off. Therefore,
S considerately blocks (x, y) with the plan (x′, y).
Lastly, we show that no subset of ¬S can block (x′, y) with secession. Suppose other-
wise, i.e., there is a set E ⊆ I1 and a plan (x′′(i,ιi(r)))i∈E such that
x′′(i,ιi(r)) i1 x′(i,ιi(r)) ∀i ∈ E,
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∑
i∈E
x′′(i,ιi(r)) =
∑
i∈E
e(i,ιi(r)).
Then the coalition S ′ = {(i, ιi(1)) : i ∈ E} can block (x, y) with secession by the plan(
x′′(i,ιi(1)) := x
′′
(i,ιi(r))
)
i∈E
, because by strict convexity of preferences,
x′′(i,ιi(1)) = x
′′
(i,ιi(r))
i1 x′(i,ιi(r)) =
∑r
k=1 x(i1,ιi1 (r))
r
i1 x(i,ιi(1)) for any i ∈ E,
and
∑
i∈E
x′′(i,ιi(1)) =
∑
i∈E
x′′(i,ιi(r)) =
∑
i∈E
e(i,ιi(r)) =
∑
i∈E
e(i,ιi(1)).
This contradicts to the assumption made above that no coalition can block (x, y) with
secession. Thus, no subset of ¬S can block (x′, y) with secession, as asserted.
With ETP, sup-fair core allocations in economies of different sizes can be identified
with the element of the same space,
(
Rl+
)I1 ×∏j1∈J1 Yj1 . Let Crsup−fair denote the subset of
this space that represents the sup-fair core in the r-replica economy.
Since an allocation can be fairly blocked if it can be sup-fairly blocked, Lemma 3
provides another proof for the ETP of fair core allocations, Lemma 2.
5.2 Core Convergence
The proof of Theorem 1 exploits a feature in fair blocking such that the outsiders of a blocking
coalition has to act as a whole in order to secession-block the coalition. This feature is no
longer available in the notion of sup-fair blocking, as any set of outsiders can secession-block
the coalition.
To prove core convergence based on sup-fair blocking, our construction of a blocking
plan is more involved. We sketch the idea here and illustrate it with Figure 1.
i. Say (x, y) is the non-equilibrium allocation that we try to block sup-fairly. As that
can be done trivially if (x, y) is not Pareto optimal, we can assume that it is Pareto
optimal and hence, by the second welfare theorem, it is supported by some price p as
a price equilibrium with transfers.
ii. Our construction starts with a blocking plan in a sufficiently large replica economy
that blocks away only one individual whose type say i′′1 enjoys a net gain from (x, y)
evaluated by the price p. In Figure 1, this individual is represented by the dark disk. To
ensure that such exclusion is feasible for the excluded person, we replicate the economy
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...
types in S+
...
type i′′1
... · · ·
· · ·
...
m copies
... ... · · ·
· · ·
...
h copies
... ... · · · ...
n copies
Sm
Sh−
Sh+ S
n
Figure 1: The blocking coalition Sm ∪ Sh− ∪ Sn
a` la our recent paper [17] so that the additional copies of the prototype economy have
enough resources to be shared with the excluded person.
iii. With the economy replicated, however, uninvolved individuals are added to the econ-
omy, hence we need to ensure that none of them can benefit from forming a secession
coalition with the excluded individual. To do that, we transfer a bundle z from the
excluded type-i′′1 person to some of the uninvolved individuals, leaving only something
for this person merely good enough so that he cannot gain from seceding by himself.
The bundle z is distributed only to those types of uninvolved individuals such that
their consumptions at (x, y) worth more than their endowments at the price p. These
individuals are represented by the grey disks in Figure 1. Then they cannot gain from
seceding with the excluded person.
iv. The uninvolved individuals who do not get to share the bundle z are those such that
their consumptions at (x, y) worth less than their endowments evaluated by the price p.
Hence they get better-off if they do not trade according to (x, y). To balance the
resources that they need for such an action, we simply replicate the economy further.
The aforementioned construction uses the following assumption.
Assumption 6 (differentiable utility) For any individual i, i can be represented as a
utility function that is continuously differentiable in the interior of the consumption set.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 6. If (x, y) is supported by price p as a price equilibrium
with transfers, if xi  0 for all individuals i, and if z ∈ Rl such that p · z > 0, then for all i,
xi +
z
m
i xi
20
xi
xi + z
xi +
z
m
∇ui(xi) = µip for some µi > 0
Figure 2: The bundle xi +
z
m
belongs to the upper contour set if m is sufficiently small
for any sufficiently large m.
Proof See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [14, p658]. (Figure 2, borrowed from their
Figure 18.B.3, illustrates the intuition.)
Lemma 5 By Assumptions 1, 2 and 5, in any sup-fair core allocation (x, y), xi  0 for all
i ∈ I.
Proof Let (x, y) be a sup-fair core allocation. First, for all i ∈ I, xi 6= 0, otherwise by
strong monotonicity (Assumption 1) {i} can block (x, y) with secession, since 0 6= ei i 0.
Second, recall from Xiong and Zheng [17] that an allocation (x, y) is said edgy if the
aggregate consumption bundle
∑
i∈I xi lies on the boundary of the consumption set Rl+.
As the sup-fair core allocation (x, y) has the ETP (Lemma 3), it follows from Xiong and
Zheng [17, Lemma 10] and Assumption 5 that (x, y) is not edgy, otherwise (x, y) would be
considerately blocked by the grand coalition and hence is also sup-fairly blocked by the grand
coalition.
Third, we show that xi  0 for all i ∈ I. Suppose not. Then some individual i
consumes zero quantity of some good k, i.e., (xi)k = 0. As already established, xi 6= 0,
so i consumes a positive quantity (xi)k′ of another good k
′. Since the allocation is not
edgy, another individual i′ consumes a positive quantity (xi′)k of good k. Then change
the allocation (x, y) by giving all the (xi)k′ units of good k
′ from individual i to i′ (without
changing production). That makes i′ better-off by his strongly monotone preference; thus, by
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lower semicontinuity of his preference, we further have individual i′ return to i a sufficiently
small positive amount of both goods k and k′ such that i′ remains better-off than the status
quo (x, y). Repeat the above procedure if there is another good for which person i consumes
zero quantity. Then we eventually move individual i’s consumption from the boundary to
the interior of Rl+, hence he is better-off by the boundary aversion assumption; any other
individual (such as i′) involved in this process is also better-off. Finally, transfer a sufficiently
small bundle v ∈ Rl++ from i and distribute it evenly among all individuals so that everyone is
better-off than the original allocation (x, y). Then the grand coalition blocks (x, y), because
the feasibility condition for the grand coalition is satisfied since the total consumption does
not change. As the complement of the grand coalition is empty, this suffices a sup-fair
blocking of (x, y).
With a similar argument for fair cores in Section 4, we can show that the sup-fair cores
shrink as we enlarge the economy, i.e., C1sup−fair ⊇ C2sup−fair ⊇ C3sup−fair.... Theorem 2 shows
that the sup-fair cores actually converge to Walrus equilibria as we enlarge economy.
Theorem 2 By Assumptions 1–6, W = ∩∞r=1Crsup−fair.
Proof Since Crfair ⊆ Crsup−fair and W ⊆ ∩∞r=1Crfair, we have W ⊆ ∩∞r=1Crsup−fair.
We still need to prove ∩∞r=1Crsup−fair ⊆W. Pick any (x, y) /∈W, we will prove (x, y) /∈
∩∞r=1Crsup−fair. By Lemma 3, we may assume without loss that (x, y) satisfies ETP.
We may assume without loss that (x, y) is Pareto optimal (otherwise it is blocked by
the grand coalition). Then it is a price equilibrium with nonzero transfer under some price p
(Xiong and Zheng [17, Appendix A]).
If (x, y) can be blocked with secession in some Er, then (x, y) /∈ ∩∞r=1Crsup−fair. For the
rest of the proof, suppose that (x, y) cannot be blocked with secession in any Er.
There are two cases: (i) (x, y) is a pure exchange allocation, i.e., of the form (x, y | y =
0); (ii) (x, y) is a productive allocation, i.e., of the form (x, y | y 6= 0).
First, consider case (i), y = 0.
There is some i′1 ∈ I1 who gets strictly negative transfer, i.e., p ·xi′1 < p · ei′1 . Note that
the profit from firms is zero because y = 0.
We show that (x, y) can be blocked with secession in Er+1 for sufficiently large r.
Consider the coalition E := Er ∪ {(i′1, r + 1)} with the plan((
x∗(i1,h) := x(i1,h) +
ei′
1
− xi′
1
r × |I1|
)
i1∈I1,h∈{1,2,...,r}
,
(
x∗(i′1,r+1)
:= x(i′1,r+1)
)
,
(
y∗j := yj = 0
)
j∈J
)
.
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Under this plan, resources are balanced, with the total bundle for E being
∑
i∈E ei. By
Lemma 4, when r is large enough, everyone in Er gets strictly better-off than (x, y), and the
person (i′1, r + 1) as well off. (Here we use Assumption 6 and the fact that x(i1,h)  0 for all
(i1, h), which follows from Lemma 5.) Thus, the coalition E blocks (x, y) with secession by
the plan (x∗, y∗), a contradiction.
Second, consider case (i), y 6= 0.
Since (x, y) 6∈W, there exists some i′′1 ∈ I1 who gets strictly positive transfer, i.e.,
p · xi′′1 > p · ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 ,j1p · yj1 and (6)∑
i1∈I1\{i′′1}
p · xi1 <
∑
i1∈I1\{i′′1}
p · ei1 +
∑
i1∈I1\{i′′1}
∑
j1∈J1
θi1,j1p · yj1 . (7)
From profit maximization at (x, y) and the assumption 0 ∈ Yj1 for all j1, we have
p · ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 ,j1p · yj1 ≥ p · ei′′1 .
Let us start with the sub-case where
p · ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 ,j1p · yj1 = p · ei′′1 .
As p · yj1 ≥ 0 for all j1, this sub-case implies θi′′1 j1p · yj1 = 0 for all j1. Since the profit
maximizer is unique (Assumption 4), we have θi′′1 ,j1 > 0 implies yj1 = 0. Therefore,
ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 ,j1yj1 = ei′′1 . (8)
We show that (x, y) can be sup-fairly blocked in EW+1 for sufficiently large W . Consider the
coalition E := I\{(i′′1,W + 1)} which includes everyone in EW+1 except the type-i′′1 individual
in the last replica economy. The following is the desired blocking allocation.((
xi := xi +
xi′′1 − ei′′1
(W + 1)× |I1| − 1
)
i∈I\{(i′′1 ,W+1)}
,
(
x(i′′1 ,W+1)
:= ei′′1
)
,
(
yj := yj
)
j∈J
)
.
Under this blocking plan, resources are balanced within E by (8), and trivially balanced
within EW+1 \E = {(i′′1,W + 1)}. By Lemma 4, for sufficiently large W , everyone in E gets
strictly better off, and hence E considerately blocks (x, y). Since the outsider (i′′1,W + 1)
cannot be better-off than consuming ei′′1 by blocking with secession, this constitutes a sup-fair
blocking plan.
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x˜i′′1
p · zi′′1 = p · ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1 θi′′1 ,j1 × p · yj1
p · zi′′1 = p · x˜i′′1
ei′′1
p · zi′′1 = p · ei′′1
Figure 3: The bundle x˜i′′1
We are left with the sub-case where
p · ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 ,j1 × p · yj1 > p · ei′′1 .
This inequality implies that there exists an x˜i′′1 such that
p · xi′′1
(6)
> p · ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 ,j1 × p · yj1 > p · x˜i′′1 > p · ei′′1 . (9)
Without loss of generality, assume that x˜i′′1 is a utility maximizer under the price p and the
wealth p · x˜i′′1 (Figure 3). Then for any z i′′1 x˜i′′1 , we have
p · z ≥ p · x˜i′′1 > p · ei′′1 . (10)
We shall complete the proof by constructing an alternative allocation (x∗, y∗) that sup-fairly
blocks (x, y) in a sufficiently large replica economy. The alternative production plan y∗ is
defined to be the same as the status quo,
y∗j1 := yj1 ∀j1 ∈ J1.
The construction of the alternative consumption plan x∗ is more involved. The blocking
coalition in our construction will be some Sm ∪ Sh− ∪ Sn. Here Sm is a sufficiently large, m-
fold replica economy with only one individual excluded. The resources of the excluded
individual are balanced by a subset Sh+ of another sufficiently large h-fold replica economy.
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The complement of Sh+ in this replica economy is S
h
−, and the resources of S
h
− are balanced
by a third sufficiently large n-fold replica economy Sn. See Figure 1 for the illustration.
Now we construct the plan formally. First, consider the following bundle, which is the
resources that would be freed up if a type-i′′1 individual is excluded:
x′′i1 −
(
ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 j1yj1
)
.
By Lemma 4, Ineq. (6), and the fact that xi1  0 for all i (Lemma 5), there exists a
sufficiently large m such that
xmi1 := xi1 +
x′′i1 −
(
ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1 θi′′1 j1yj1
)
(m+ 1)× |I1| − 1 i1 xi1 ∀i1 ∈ I1.
Hence define
x∗(i1,i2) := x
m
i1
for every (i1, i2) ∈ Sm with
Sm := {(i1, 1) : i1 6= i′′1} ∪ {(i1, i2) : i1 ∈ I1; i2 ∈ {2, . . . ,m+ 1}}.
I.e., exclude individual (i′′1, 1) and distribute the bundle freed up thereof to individuals in S
m
so that everyone in Sm is strictly better-off than (x, y). Let the consumption for (i′′1, 1) be
x∗(i′′1 ,1) := x˜i′′1 .
Then this person needs to receive a bundle
x˜i′′1 −
(
ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi′′1 j1yj1
)
.
To balance that, partition I1 into two subsets I
+
1 and I
−
1 :
I+1 = {i1 ∈ I1 : p · xi1 ≥ p · ei1} ,
I−1 = {i1 ∈ I1 : p · xi1 < p · ei1} .
Note that I+1 6= ∅, as i′′1 ∈ I+1 . By the second inequality of (9), Lemma 4 again implies that
there exists a sufficiently large h such that
xhi1 := xi1 +
ei′′1 +
∑
j1∈J1 θi′′1 j1yj1 − x˜i′′1
h× |I+1 |
i1 xi1 ∀i1 ∈ I1.
25
Hence define
x∗(i1,i2) := x
h
i1
for every (i1, i2) ∈ Sh+ with
Sh+ := I
+
1 × {m+ 2, . . . ,m+ h+ 1}.
I.e., we balance the resources of individual (i′′1, 1) by having him trade exclusively with the
individuals in Sh+ so that everyone in S
h
+ is strictly better-off than (x, y). But then the
individuals in Sh−, with
Sh− := I
−
1 × {m+ 2, . . . ,m+ h+ 1},
are left out (by Sh+) and so their resources need to be balanced. To stay put with their
consumptions in (x, y), the individuals in Sh− need to give away a total bundle∑
i1∈I−1
(
ei1 +
∑
j1∈J1
θi1j1yj1 − xi1
)
,
which, by the definition of I−1 and the fact p · yj1 ≥ 0 for all j1, has a positive value when
evaluated by the price p. Then Lemma 4 again implies that there exists a sufficiently large
n such that
xni1 := xi1 +
∑
i1∈I−1
(
ei1 +
∑
j1∈J1 θi1j1yj1 − xi1
)
n× |I1| i1 xi1 ∀i1 ∈ I1.
Thus, define
x∗(i1,i2) :=
 xi1 if (i1, i2) ∈ Sh−xni1 if (i1, i2) ∈ Sn,
with
Sn := I1 × {m+ h+ 2, . . . ,m+ h+ n+ 1}.
I.e., we balance the resources of the individuals in Sh− by distributing the resources they free
up to an additional n-replica economy Sn so that everyone in Sh− is as well off as in (x, y)
and everyone in Sn is strictly better-off than (x, y).
In the (m+ h+ n+ 1)-replica economy Em+h+n+1, consider the coalition
S∗ := Sm ∪ Sh− ∪ Sn
with the blocking plan (x∗, y∗) defined above. By construction, (x∗, y∗) is feasible within S∗
and feasible within the outsiders, Sh+∪{(i′′1, 1)}. Since the individuals in Sm∪Sn are strictly
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better-off than (x, y) and those in Sh− are as well-off as (x, y), by lower semi-continuous
preferences, we can transfer some resources from the former to the latter so that everyone
in S∗ is strictly better-off. Thus, (S∗, (x∗, y∗)) considerately blocks (x, y).
Finally, we show that no subset of Sh+ ∪ {(i′′1, 1)} can block (x∗, y∗) with secession.
Suppose T ⊆ Sh+∪{(i′′1, 1)} secession-blocks (x∗, y∗) with a consumption plan (xˆi)i∈T so that∑
i∈T xˆi =
∑
i∈T ei and xˆi i x∗i for all i ∈ T . If i = (i′′1, 1) ∈ T , then xˆi i x∗i = x˜i′′1 and
(10) implies that p · xˆi > p · ei. If i ∈ T \ {(i′′1, 1)}, then i ∈ Sh+, so xˆi i x∗i = xhi1 i xi; with
(x, y) being a price equilibrium with transfers under price p, we have p · xˆi > p · xi ≥ p · ei
by the definition of I+1 . But then we have∑
i∈T
p · xˆi >
∑
i∈T
p · ei,
a contradiction. Therefore, T cannot block (x∗, y∗) with secession. Hence (S∗, (x∗, y∗))
sup-fairly blocks the non-equilbrium allocation (x, y), as asserted.
6 Conclusion
The traditional core equivalence theory captures an utmost form of competition where anyone
who may gain any surplus above the competitive level will have his surplus competed away by
someone who slightly outbids him. The modern economics of information may be regarded
as a framework to capture a friction due to asymmetric information that dampens such
unhindered competition.
This paper is aimed at another kind of friction—the objection from the potential losers
of competition such as workers protesting the outsourcing of their jobs. The disruptive effect
of such objections forces the potential winners not to completely ignore the interests of the
losers. Different from the friction driven by asymmetric information in the economics of
information, such friction is due to the conflict of interests in the division of a pie.
In the language of core equivalence, the competitive behaviors such as outbidding
and undercutting would be captured by the notion of blocking, with the potential winners
corresponding to the blocking coalition, and the potential losers the coalition’s complement.
The existing core equivalence literature disregards the interests of the complement of a
blocking coalition. This paper takes into account their interests by restricting blocking
coalitions with a participation condition—which is driven by the property rights on the
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firms—that a blocking coalition should not make its complement so worse-off that the latter
would rather resort to secession that disrupts production. Our theory of fair and sup-fair
cores is a preliminary description of the outcomes driven by the kind of competition hampered
by such threat of social unrest.
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